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Abstract
In the United States, rising energy efficiency, rather than the use of less carbon-
intensive energy sources, has driven the decline in the carbon intensity of output.
Thus, understanding how environmental policy will affect energy efficiency should be
a primary concern for climate change mitigation. In this paper, I evaluate the effect of
environmental taxes on energy use in the United States. To do so, I construct a putty-
clay model of directed technical change that matches several key features of the data
on U.S. energy use. The model builds upon the standard Cobb-Douglas approach used
in climate change economics in two ways. First, it allows the elasticity of substitution
between energy and non-energy inputs to differ in the short and long run. Second,
it allows for endogenous and directed technical change. In the absence of climate
policy, the new putty-clay model of directed technical change and the standard Cobb-
Douglas approach have identical predictions for long-run energy use. The reactions to
climate policies, however, differ substantially. In particular, the new putty-clay model
of directed technical change suggests that a 6.9-fold energy tax in 2055 is necessary
to achieve policy goals consistent with the 2016 Paris Agreement and that such a tax
would lead to 6.8% lower consumption when compared to a world without taxes. By
contrast, the standard Cobb-Douglas approach suggests that a 4.7-fold tax rate in
2055 is sufficient, which leads to a 2% decrease in consumption. Thus, compared to
the standard approach, the new model predicts that greater taxation and more forgone
consumption are necessary to achieve environmental policy goals.
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1 Introduction
To combat global climate change, it is crucial to understand how carbon emissions will respond to
policy interventions, and energy efficiency will be an important component of this reaction. Indeed,
rising energy efficiency, rather than the use of less carbon intensive energy sources, has been the
major force behind the decline in the carbon intensity of output in the United States over the last
40 years (Raupach et al., 2007; Nordhaus, 2013). Thus, energy efficiency will be a major factor in
any future approach to mitigating climate change.
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are the standard tool in climate change economics. They
combine models of the economy and climate to calculate optimal carbon taxes. The leading models
in this literature frequently treat energy as an input in a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production
function (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2003; Golosov et al., 2014).1 Despite the significant insights gained
from the IAMs, there are two restrictive assumptions in this approach to modeling energy. First,
in response to changes in energy prices, the Cobb-Douglas approach allows smooth substitution
between capital and labor, which is at odds with short-run features of the U.S data (Pindyck and
Rotemberg, 1983; Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b). This suggests that the standard approach may not
fully capture the effect of new environmental taxes, which will raise the effective price of energy.
Second, technological change is exogenous and undirected in the standard model. A substantial
literature, however, suggests that improvements in energy-specific technology will play a pivotal
in combating climate change and that environmentally-friendly research investments respond to
economic incentives (e.g., Popp et al., 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2012).
In this paper, I construct a putty-clay model of directed technical change that matches several
key features of the data on U.S. energy use. In particular, the model developed in this paper captures
the short-run dynamics between energy prices and energy use, and it incorporates technological
progress. In the model, each piece of capital requires a fixed amount of energy to operate at full
potential. Technical change, however, can alter the lower this input requirement in the next vintage
of the capital good, or it can increase the ability of the next vintage to produce final output.2,3
When energy prices rise, the energy expenditure share of output will increase in the short run, but
1This is particularly relevant to the literature building on the standard neoclassical growth model. Another
strand of the climate change literature uses large computable general equilibrium models. Of particular relevance to
the current paper are analyses using the EPPA (Morris et al., 2012) or Imaclim (Crassous et al., 2006) models, each
of which has elements of putty-clay production.
2Capital good producers turn raw capital, ‘putty,’ into a capital good with certain technological characteristics,
including energy efficiency. While energy efficiency can be improved by research and development, there is no
substitution between energy and non-energy inputs once the capital good in constructed, capturing the rigid ‘clay’
properties of installed capital.
3The literature on putty-clay production functions has a long history (e.g., Johansen, 1959; Solow, 1962; Cass and
Stiglitz, 1969; Calvo, 1976). Of particular relevance is work by Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) who investigate the role of
putty-clay production in explaining the patterns of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs in production.
The older literature on putty-clay models focuses on choosing a type of capital from an existing distribution. The
current paper focuses on how the cutting-edge of technology, which is embodied in capital goods, evolves over time.
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firms will have an increased incentive to improve the energy efficiency of new capital goods, driving
the expenditure share back down.4
Rather than importing the seminal directed technical change model developed by Acemoglu
(1998, 2002, 2007), I take a new approach in which innovation occurs in different characteristics of
capital goods, not in different sectors. In other words, energy efficiency occurs when capital goods
require less energy to run, not when the energy sector becomes more efficient at turning primary
energy (e.g., coal) into final-use energy (e.g., electricity). This modeling choice is motivated by data
from the United States, where reductions in the energy intensity of output have been driven by
decreases in final-use energy intensity. This theoretical innovation significantly alters the underlying
incentives for research and development.
In the absence of climate policy, the new model and the standard Cobb-Douglas approach have
identical predictions for long-run energy use. The putty-clay model of directed technical change,
however, predicts significantly different reactions to climate policy. In particular, I apply energy
taxes necessary to achieve environmental policy goals laid out in international agreements.5 The
new putty-clay model of directed technical change suggests that a 6.9-fold energy tax in 2055 is
necessary to achieve policy goals consistent with the 2016 Paris Agreement and that such a tax
would lead to 6.8% lower consumption when compared to a world without taxes.6 By contrast,
the standard Cobb-Douglas approach suggests that a 4.7-fold tax rate in 2055 is sufficient, which
leads to a 2% decrease in consumption. When applying the same tax rate to both models, the
new putty-clay model of directed technical change predicts 20% greater cumulative energy use over
the next century. Thus, compared to the standard approach, the new model predicts that greater
taxation and more forgone consumption are necessary to achieve environmental policy goals.
While the focus of the paper is measuring the impact of climate policies on energy use, the
model also has predictions for the long-run sustainability of economic growth in a world with non-
renewable resources. In particular, the model predicts that, despite the low elasticity of substitution
between energy and non-energy inputs in production, consumption and output per capita can
continue to grow at current rates indefinitely, even as energy extraction costs tend towards infinity.
This occurs because, in the long run, improvements in energy efficiency exactly offset increases in
4As discussed in the next section, this modeling approach draws insight from Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b), who
provide econometric evidence that a putty-clay model of directed technical change could fit patterns of substitution
in U.S. energy use and investigate the implication of these forces for long-run economic growth in a social planner’s
model with finite energy resources and an aggregate production.
5In particular, I simulate taxes needed to reduce energy use to 60% of 2005 levels by the year 2055. This is consis-
tent with goals laid out in the recent Paris Agreement, which suggests that the United States adopt policies consistent
with a 80% reduction in carbon emission by 2050. Thus, I examine a case where half of the required reduction in
carbon emissions comes from reductions in energy use. The goals are outlined in the Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution (INDC) submitted by the United States to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCC), which is available at: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/
United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf.
6This analysis abstracts from the consumption losses caused by climate change. As a result, the ‘forgone’ con-
sumption is a measure of the economic cost of implementing environmentally friendly policies, which would need
to be balanced again damages from environmental degradation to calculate optimal policy. In this paper, I take a
different approach and examine the policies necessary to achieve stated, rather than optimal, goals for environmental
policy.
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extraction costs, leading to a constant long-run energy expenditure share of output. This result
is more optimistic than those in the existing literature (Krautkraemer, 1998; Hassler et al., 2012,
2016b; Peretto and Valente, 2015).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section
3 discusses the empirical motivation underlying the theoretical underpinning of the paper. The
model is presented in Section 4 and the calibration in section 5. Section 6 reports the results of the
quantitative analysis, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
As described above, this paper contributes to the literature on climate change economics that takes
a Cobb-Douglas approach to energy modeling in IAMs. This paper is also closely related to a grow-
ing literature demonstrating that directed technical change (DTC) has important implications for
environmental policy. These studies generally focus on clean versus dirty sources of energy, rather
than energy efficiency. Acemoglu et al. (2012) demonstrate the role that DTC can play in prevent-
ing environmental disasters and emphasize the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty
production methods. The model in this paper bears more resemblance to an ‘alternate’ approach
they mention where firms can invest in quality improvements or carbon abatement, where the latter
only occurs in the presence of carbon taxes. Peretto (2008) and Gans (2012) also conduct an anal-
yses where policy interventions affect how technological change is directed between production and
abatement activities. Aghion et al. (2016) provide a directed technical change model of clean and
dirty innovation in the automotive industry that includes an intra-product decision about energy
efficiency. I build on these earlier works by constructing a new model of directed technical change,
focusing on energy efficiency, quantitatively investigating the macroeconomic effects of prominent
environmental policies, and comparing the results to the standard approach taken in IAMs.7
Two recent papers extend the standard DTC model to quantitative investigation of macroeco-
nomic policy (Fried, 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2016). Both focus on the issue of clean versus dirty
energy sources, rather than energy efficiency. Methodologically, this paper is closer to the approach
taken by Fried (2015), who accounts for energy efficiency by calibrating growth in clean energy to
overall de-carbonization of the economy, which includes overall energy efficiency as well as shifts
towards the clean energy sector. In this way, the current paper builds on her work by explicitly
investigating energy efficiency as a separate source of innovation that is complementary with other
inputs, using a new underlying model of DTC, and comparing the results to the standard approach
taken in climate change economics.
This paper is also closely related to the pioneering paper of Smulders and De Nooij (2003) who
apply the original DTC model directly to energy efficiency and use it to analyze the effects of exoge-
nous changes in energy availability. Andre´ and Smulders (2014) extend this analysis to incorporate
7A related and influential literature looks at induced, but not directed, technical change and its implications for
climate policy. These models tend to focus on social planner problems. Key contributions in this literature include
Goulder and Schneider (1999), Goulder and Mathai (2000), Sue Wing (2003), and Popp (2004).
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Hotelling forces and examine the role of changes in extraction technology. Other recent advances
in the relatively small energy efficiency and DTC literature include studies by Lemoine (2015),
who examines how changes in resource-specific energy efficiency can lead to energy transitions, and
Van der Meijden and Smulders (2014), who investigate the dual effects of expectations and directed
technical change in energy efficiency. I build upon this energy efficiency literature by construct-
ing a new model of DTC that can recreate key data patterns, using it to quantitatively evaluate
prominent environmental policies, and comparing the results to the Cobb-Douglas approach.
The new putty-clay model of directed technical change builds on the aggregate model of energy
use developed by Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b). The current model differs from their work in two
key respects. First, rather than focusing on a social planner model and an aggregate production
function, I construct a decentralized model with incentives for innovation. Second, I consider the
case of infinite potential supplies of energy and increasing extraction costs, whereas Hassler et al.
(2012, 2016b) investigate the optimal depletion of a fixed resource. These methodological differences
add realism, allowing me to investigate the impacts of climate change mitigation policy, which is
the primary goal of this study. The decentralized model is important to account for inter-temporal
externalities and to capture the difference between primary and final-use energy. The potentially
infinite supply of energy captures the role of coal in fossil fuel energy use.8 Moreover, as prices rise,
new methods of resource extraction will become feasible, expanding the supply of available energy
sources.9
While the primary goal of this study is to evaluate the effect of taxation on energy use, I
also arrive at significantly different long-run predictions for consumption growth and the energy
expenditure share when compared to Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b). In particular, I find that the
data over the last several decades is consistent with a balanced growth path in the decentralized
model, suggesting that current trends can continue indefinitely.10 On the other hand, the current
data is inconsistent with the balanced growth path in a model where a social planner optimally
depletes a finite energy resource. Thus, Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b) find that the energy share must
increase significantly and consumption growth must decrease in order to converge to a balanced
growth path in the long run.
It is also important to note that the DTC literature is supported by microeconomic studies that
investigate the presence of directed technical change. Newell et al. (1999) and Jaffe et al. (2003)
demonstrate that the energy efficiency of energy-intensive consumer durables (air conditioners and
gas water heaters) responds to changes in prices and government regulations, providing evidence
for the existence of directed technical change. Similarly, Popp (2002) finds that energy efficiency
8Coal is predicted to to be the primary driver of global carbon emissions and is available in abundant supply
(Golosov et al., 2014; Hassler et al., 2016a).
9For example, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) recently estimated that there were 565 billion barrels
of oil (BBO) of undiscovered conventional crude oil reserves in the world (excluding the United States), but 513 BBO
of undiscovered and harder-to-extract ‘unconventional’ reserves, such as oil shale and oil sands, in Venezuela alone
(Schenk et al., 2012).
10This is also consistent with the standard Cobb-Douglas approach to energy model within climate change eco-
nomics (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2003; Golosov et al., 2014).
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innovation, as measured by patents, responds to changes in energy prices. He looks at both innova-
tions in the energy sector and in the energy efficiency characteristics of other capital goods. More
recently Dechezlepreˆtre et al. (2011) and Calel and Dechezlepretre (2016) find that patents for ‘low
carbon’ technologies, which include more energy efficient and less carbon intensive innovations,
respond to both energy prices and public policies designed specifically to address climate change.
Aghion et al. (2016) find that government policies have a strong effect on energy efficient research
in the automotive sector.
3 Empirical Motivation
In this section, I discuss a number of patterns in the data that motivate the theoretical choices made
in this paper. In particular, I present evidence that a) declines in the final-use energy intensity
of output drive of reductions in the carbon intensity of output, b) there is very low short-run
elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs, and c) there is no long-run trend
in the energy expenditure share of final output.
To analyze the determinants of the carbon intensity of output, I consider the following decom-
position:
CO2
Y
=
CO2
Ep
· Ep
Ef
· Ef
Y
, (1)
where CO2 is yearly carbon emissions, Y is gross domestic product, Ep is primary energy use
(e.g., coal, oil), and Ef is final-use energy consumption (e.g., electricity, gasoline). The carbon
intensity of primary energy, CO2Ep , captures substitution between clean and dirty sources of energy
(e.g., coal versus solar). The efficiency of the energy sector, which transforms primary energy into
final-use energy, is captured by
Ep
Ef
. For example, the ratio decreases when power plants become
more efficient at transforming coal into electricity. The final-use energy intensity of output,
Ef
Y ,
measures the quantity of final-use energy used in production and consumption. For example, the
ratio decreases when manufacturing firms use less electricity to produce the same quantity of goods.
The results of this decomposition are presented in figure 1, which plots the carbon intensity
of output and each component from equation (1) for the United States from 1971-2011. Data are
normalized to 1971 values. Energy and carbon dioxide data are from the International Energy
Agency (IEA).11 Real GDP data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).12 The
carbon intensity of output fell over 60% during this time period, and this decline is matched almost
exactly by the decline in the final-use energy intensity of output. Thus, the results demonstrate
the primary importance of
Ef
Y in understanding how the economy will react to climate change
mitigation policy. The carbon intensity of primary energy, CO2Ep , declined approximately 10% over
this period. While this is a significant improvement for environmental outcomes, it is relatively
11See ‘IEA Headline Energy Data’ at http://www.iea.org/statistics/topics/energybalances/.
12See Section 1 of the NIPA tables at: https://www.bea.gov//national/nipaweb/DownSS2.asp.
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small compared to the overall improvements in the carbon intensity of output. Finally, the efficiency
of the energy transformation sector, as measured by the inverse of
Ep
Ef
, actually declined roughly
15% over this period, indicating that it offset the environmental benefits achieved elsewhere. This
result is driven by differences in the efficiency of transformation across different sources of primary
energy, rather than technological regress. The results reject the notion that improvements in the
carbon or energy intensity of output have been driven by technological improvements in the energy
transformation sector.
Motivated by this evidence, I construct a model that focuses on the final-use energy intensity
of output. This creates a significant break with existing work. Existing macroeconomic research
on directed technical change and climate change focuses on clean versus dirty sources of energy
and abstracts from energy efficiency (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Fried, 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2016).
Transition to cleaner energy sources will undoubtedly be an important component of any approach
to mitigate climate change, but the historical data strongly suggest that improved energy efficiency
will be a pivotal aspect of any policy response. At the same time, applying the seminal DTC
model of Acemoglu (1998, 2002, 2007) to the question of energy efficiency would require focusing
on the efficiency of the energy sector (e.g., Smulders and De Nooij, 2003; Andre´ and Smulders,
2014). Thus, I construct a new model where energy efficiency is driven by the energy requirements
of capital goods, rather than the productivity of the energy transformation sector. This theoretical
innovation significantly alters the underlying incentives for research and development.13
Figure 2 plots an index of real fossil fuel prices, the expenditure share of fossil fuel energy, and
total fossil fuel energy use in the United States from 1971-2011. Energy use and price data are from
the U.S. Energy Information Agency.14 The sample is restricted to fossil fuels due to limitation on
the price data, and a very similar graph serves as the motivation for Hassler et al. (2012). Output is
again from the BEA. The data indicate that expenditure, but not total fossil fuel energy use, reacts
to short-term price fluctuations, suggesting that there is very low short-run substitution between
energy and non-energy inputs. At the same time, there is no trend in the energy expenditure share
of output, suggesting a constant long-run level in the absence of shocks. The model in this paper
will match both of these facts. Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b) provide a formal maximum likelihood
estimate of the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs using this data.
They find an elasticity of substitution very close to zero. For the purposes of this paper, I will
treat the elasticity as exactly zero and use a Leontief production structure, which allows for the
13Of course, not all improvements in energy efficiency need to driven by technical change. In particular, sectoral
reallocation could explain aggregate changes in energy use. Recent papers addressing this question find that techno-
logical change, rather than sectoral reallocation, is the key driver of falling energy intensity over this period (Wing
and Eckaus, 2007; Wing, 2008). The same studies suggest that, prior to 1970, sectoral reallocation with the primary
driver of falling energy intensity. Thus, this paper will focus on the post-1970 period. A shortcoming of this approach
is that the model will not be able to explain trends in energy efficiency at earlier points in time. Such a model would
likely need to combine structural change with technological improvements in energy efficiency.
14See table 3.1 ‘Fossil fuel production prices, 1949-2011’ and table 1.3 ‘Primary energy consumption estimates by
source, 1949-2012’ at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/.
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Figure 1: This figure decomposes the decline in the carbon intensity of output. CO2 is yearly carbon emissions,
Y is GDP, Ep is primary energy, and Ef is final-use energy. This figure demonstrates that the fall in the carbon
intensity of output CO2
Y
has been driven by decreases in final-use energy intensity of output
Ef
Y
, rather than the use
of cleaner energy sources, CO2
Ep
, or a more efficient energy transformation sector,
Ep
Ef
. Data are from the International
Energy Agency (IEA) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). All values are normalized to 1971 levels.
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Figure 2: This figure demonstrates that short-run movements in energy prices affect short-run expenditures, but
have very little affect on short-run energy use. At the same time, there is no trend in the energy expenditure share of
output. Only fossil fuels are considered due to limitations in price data. Data are taken from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the Energy Information Agency. All values are normalized to 1971 levels.
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construction of a tractable putty-clay model. They also find that energy efficiency increases after
prices rise, suggesting a putty-clay model of the type investigated here.15
The trendless expenditure share of energy in figure 2, in combination with the analysis of Hassler
et al. (2012, 2016b), serves as the motivation for the Cobb-Douglas production function in IAMs
(Golosov et al., 2014; Barrage, 2014). At the same time, the analysis by Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b)
suggests that the long-run energy expenditure share – which will eventually be constant must be
significantly higher than the current level. The model developed in this paper will bridge the gap
between these two approaches. It yields a constant energy expenditure share that matches the
current level, while simultaneously replicating both short- and long-run patterns of substitution.
4 Model
4.1 Structure
4.1.1 Final Good Production
The production structure of the model extends the standard DTC production function to account
for energy use. To match the extremely low short-run elasticity of substitution between energy and
non-energy inputs (see figure 3), I use a Leontief structure
Qt =
∫ 1
0
min[AN,t(i)Xt(i)
αL1−αt , AE,t(i)Et(i)] di, (2)
s.t. AE,t(i)Et(i) ≤ AN,t(i)Xt(i)αL1−αt ∀i, (3)
where Qt is gross output at time t, Lt is the aggregate (and inelastic) labor supply, AN,t(i) is the
the quality of capital good i, Xt(i) is the quantity of capital good i, AE,t(i) is the energy efficiency
of capital good i, and Et(i) is the amount of energy devoted to operating capital good i. Several
components of the production function warrant further discussion. As in the standard endogenous
growth production function, output is generated by a Cobb-Douglas combination of aggregate labor,
Lt, and a series of production process, each of which uses a different capital good, Xt(i). Unlike the
endogenous growth literature, each production process also requires energy to run. Thus, the usual
capital-labor composite measures the potential output that can be created using each production
process, and the actual level of output depends on the amount of energy devoted to each process,
Et(i). The notion of potential output is captured by constraint (3). Each capital good i has two
distinct technological characteristics. The quality of the capital good, AN,t(i), measures its ability
15As demonstrated in figure 2, the price of energy in the United States has had an upward trend since 1970. Thus,
this paper will treat energy prices as continually increasing. Once again, this is a good match for post-1970 data,
but not for U.S. data in the preceding two decades, where energy price actually declined. The long-run increase in
prices is consistent with theoretical work based on the Hotelling problem or increasing extraction costs (Hotelling,
1931; Pindyck, 1978), as well as empirical work suggesting a U-shaped pattern in long-run energy prices (Pindyck,
1978, 1999; Hamilton, 2012). Thus, there is strong reason to believe that, in the long-run, energy prices will have an
upward trend (Hamilton, 2008).
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to produce output, and the energy efficiency of the capital good, AE,t(i), lowers the amount of
energy needed to operate the production process at full potential.16
4.1.2 Energy Sector
Energy is available in infinite supply, but is subject to to increasing extraction costs. Models
with increasing extraction costs have a long history in energy economics (e.g., Pindyck, 1978;
Livernois and Uhler, 1987). This extraction cost is paid in final goods, and energy is provided by
a perfectly competitive sector. Recent research suggests that most new production comes from the
exploitation of new geographic areas, rather than improved technology applied to existing sources of
energy (Hamilton, 2012). Thus, increasing search costs for new sources of energy and the increased
difficulty in extracting energy from harder to access locations are likely to be primary drivers of the
increase in energy prices. As in Golosov et al. (2014), the treatment of energy sources as infinite in
potential supply captures the extreme abundance of coal, which is predicted to be the major driver
of climate change (Hassler et al., 2016a). The infinite supply of energy at increasing extraction
costs also captures the existence of ‘unconventional’ energy reserves, such as shale oil and oil sands,
which have high extraction costs, but are available in abundant supplies (Schenk et al., 2012).
The marginal cost of extraction, which will also be equal to the price due to the perfectly
competitive nature of the sector, is given by
pE,t = ξE¯
ι
t−1, (4)
where E¯t−1 is total energy ever extracted at the start of the period. The law of motion for the
stock of extracted energy is given by
E¯t = Et−1 + E¯t−1. (5)
Intuitively, at the beginning of each period, energy producers search for new sources of energy to
exploit, the cost of which is determined by total amount of energy ever extracted. This is consistent
with recent evidence from the oil industry, where drilling, but not within-well production, responds
to changes in prices (Anderson et al., 2014).17
16Consistent with the econometric literature on energy use, energy requirements depend both on the amount of
capital and the amount of labor being used in the production process (Van der Werf, 2008; Hassler et al., 2012,
2016b). Second, consistent with both the econometric and DTC literatures, improvements in non-energy technology,
AN (i), raise energy requirements (Smulders and De Nooij, 2003; Van der Werf, 2008; Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b;
Fried, 2015).
17A primary goal of this paper is to compare the results of the putty-clay model to the standard Cobb-Douglas
approach used in IAMs. Since IAMs examine worldwide outcomes, it is crucial to consider the equilibrium effect
of policy on energy prices. Hence, the comparison between models is most accurate when considering endogenous
prices. At the same time, I also use the model to investigate the affect of policies pursued in the United States. In
this case, endogenous energy prices can be motivated in two ways. First, it is possible to think of the United States
as a closed economy, which has obvious limitations considering the global nature of energy sector. Alternatively, one
can imagine the policies being applied on a worldwide level with the United States making up a constant fraction of
total energy. To ensure that the key qualitative results of the paper are not driven by this assumption, I also consider
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4.1.3 Final Output
Final output is given by gross production less total energy extraction costs, which are equal to
energy expenditures by the final good producer. As long as equation (3) holds with equality,18 final
output is given by
Yt = L
1−α
t
∫ 1
0
AN,t(i)
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
]
Xt(i)
α di. (6)
This formulation helps illuminate the continuity between the production function used here and
the standard approach in endogenous growth models. Output has the classic Cobb-Douglas form
with aggregate labor interacting with a continuum of perfectly substitutable types of capital. As
in the endogenous growth literature, this structure maintains tractability in the putty-clay model,
despite the Leontief nature of production.
Final output can either be consumed or saved for next period. In the empirical application,
each period will be ten years. Following existing literature, I assume complete depreciation between
periods (Golosov et al., 2014). Thus, market clearing in final goods implies
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 = Ltwt + rtKt + Πt + p
R
t + Tt, (7)
where Kt is aggregate capital, Πt is total profits, p
R
t is total payments to R&D inputs (discussed in
the next section), and Tt is total government revenue, which is distributed lump sum to consumers.
4.1.4 Capital Goods and Research
Each type of capital good is produced by a single profit-maximizing monopolist. This monopolist
also undertakes R&D activities to improve the characteristics of the machine, AN,t(i) and AE,t(i).
There are no entrants in the model.19 For both types of technological change, I adopt the common
specification:
AJ,t(i) =
[
1 + ηJRJ,t(i)R
−λ
J,t
]
AJ,t−1, J ∈ {N,E}, (8)
where RJ,t(i) is R&D inputs assigned to characteristic J by firm i in period t, RJ,t ≡
∫ 1
0 RJ,t(i)di,
and AJ,t−1 ≡ max{AJ,t−1(i)}. In other words, R&D builds on aggregate knowledge, AJ,t−1, and
current period within-firm research allocations, RJ,t(i), but is also subject to congestion effects R
−λ
J,t
the opposite extreme of exogenous energy prices, which implicitly treats the United States as a small open economy
taking unilateral policy actions. In this case, energy prices will increase at a constant exogenous rate.
18To ensure that equation (3) holds with equality, it is sufficient, but not necessary, to assume that capital fully
depreciates after each period. If capital fully depreciates, then in equilibrium forward looking consumers will never
‘over-invest’ in capital and drive its return to zero. This assumption will be maintained in the empirical analysis,
which uses a time period of ten years, and is also employed in Golosov et al. (2014).
19A recent analysis by Garcia-Macia et al. (2015) suggests that most innovation is due to incumbents improving
existing lines of goods. Moreover, since innovation will occur with certainty, incumbents are not at a disadvantage
relative to entrants as in Schumpeterian growth theory (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
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caused by duplicated research effort. When the period ends, patents expire and the best technology
becomes available to all firms.
There are a unit mass of R&D inputs, yielding
RN,t +RE,t = 1 ∀t. (9)
This is consistent with both existing literature on DTC and the environment (Acemoglu et al.,
2012; Fried, 2015) and the social planner model provided by (Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b).20 I
assume that the investment price is fixed at unity. Thus, market clearing implies that∫ 1
0
Xt(i)di = Kt, (10)
where Kt is aggregate capital.
4.1.5 Consumer Problem
The consumer side of the problem is standard. In particular, the representative household chooses
a path of consumption to maximize
{ct}∞t=0 = max
∞∑
t=0
βtLt
c1−θt
1− θ , (11)
where ct = Ct/Lt. The representative household takes prices and technology as given. Population
growth is given exogenously by:
Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt. (12)
4.2 Analysis
As demonstrated in Appendix 8.2, the first order conditions for the final good producer yield the
following inverse demand functions:
pX,t(i) = αAN,t(i)
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L1−αt Xt(i)
α−1, (13)
wt = (1− α)AN,t(i)
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L−αt Xt(i)
α. (14)
20Often, models of directed technical change refer to the fixed set of research inputs as scientists (Acemoglu et al.,
2012; Fried, 2015). This would be applicable here, though generating the standard Euler equation would require the
representative household to ignore scientist welfare (in the environmental literature, directed technical change and
capital are generally not included simultaneously). This would be a close approximation to a more inclusive utility
function as long as scientists made up a very small portion of the overall population. Another simple solution would
be to define utility over total consumption. With log preferences, which will be used in the empirical section, both
the putty-clay model with directed technical and the Cobb-Douglas model would yield the standard Euler equation.
For simplicity, I simply refer to research inputs, which could be scientists, research labs, etc.
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The intuition for the result is straightforward. The final good producer demands capital goods
until marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. Unlike the usual endogenous growth model,
marginal revenue is equal to marginal product minus the cost of energy needed to operate capital
goods. Consider the case where the final good producer is already operating at a point where
AN,t(i)L
1−α
t Xt(i)
α = AE,t(i)Et(i). If the final good producer purchases more capital, he receives
no increase in output unless there is a corresponding increase in energy purchased. The final good
producer realizes this when making optimal decisions and adjusts demand for capital accordingly.
This iso-elastic form for inverse demand maintains the tractability of the model.
Monopolist providers of capital goods must decide on optimal production levels and optimal
research allocations. See appendix 8.3 for a formal derivation of the monopolists’ behavior. As
usual, monopolists set price equal to a constant markup over unit costs. Since capital goods
must be rented from consumers, the unit cost is given by the rental rate, rt. Thus, monopolist
optimization yields
pX,t(i) =
1
α
rt, (15)
Xt(i) = α
2
1−α r
1
α−1
t AN,t(i)
1
1−αLt
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α , (16)
p¯iX,t(i) = (
1
α
− 1)α 21−α r
α
α−1
t AN,t(i)
1
1−αLt
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α , (17)
where p¯iX,t(i) is production profits (i.e., profits excluding research costs) of the monopolist.
To understand research dynamics, it is helpful to look at the relative prices for research inputs,
pRE,t(i)
pRN,t(i)
=
pE,tAN,t(i)
AE,t(i)2
[
1− ( pE,tAE,t(i))
] ηER−λE,tAE,t−1
ηNR
−λ
N,tAN,t−1
, (18)
where pRJ,t(i) is the rent paid to research inputs used by firm i to improve technological characteristic
J at time t. Their are several forces affecting on the returns to R&D investment. First, increases
in the price on energy increase the relative return to investing in energy efficiency. Second, the
return to investing in a particular type of R&D is increasing in the efficiency of research in that
sector. Research efficiency, in turn, depends on inherent productivity, ηJ , accumulated knowledge,
AJ,t−1, and the amount of congestion, R−λJ,t . Since energy and non-energy inputs are complements
in production, increases in AN,t(i) raise the return to investing in AE,t(i) and vice versa. These
effects, however, are asymmetric. To maximize profits, monopolists balance two forces that drive
demand for their products: ‘output-increasing’ technological progress, AN,t(i), and ‘cost-saving’
technological progress, AE,t(i). The asymmetry occurs because energy efficiency, AE,t(i), has a
negative and concave effect of the effective cost of energy,
pE,t
AE,t(i)
. Conversely, proportional increases
in AN,t(i) always lead to proportional increases in output.
In the usual DTC model, this analysis would demonstrate the role of market size and price
effects in research incentives. As demonstrated in equation (18), however, aggregate inputs do not
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affect R&D decisions in this model. In other words, market size effects play no role in this model.
This occurs because innovators are not deciding what market to enter and, instead, are deciding
how to augment different characteristics of their goods. Moreover, the price effects in this model
differ from the standard approach. In particular, if monopolists were entering different industries,
they would not be motivated by how energy efficiency improvements affect the demand for capital
goods in the non-energy sector. Thus, the price effects that drive the decisions in this model would
be externalities in the standard approach. Thus, the modeling strategy developed here significantly
affects the incentives for research and development when compared to the standard approach. This
new theoretical approach is motivated by the fact that declines in the final-use energy intensity of
output have been the primary driver of decreases in the carbon intensity of output (see figure 1
and the corresponding discussion in Section 3).
Given that all firms use common technology at the start of the period, they make identical
R&D decisions and, as a result, they end the period with identical technology. Moreover, there is a
unit mass of monopolists. Thus, RJ,t(i) = RJ,t ∀i, J, t. The optimal research allocations are given
by the implicit solution to (19) and (20),
1 + ηN (1−RE,t)1−λ
ηN (1−RE,t)−λ =
1 + ηER
1−λ
E,t
ηER
−λ
E,t
[AE,t−1
pE,t
(1 + ηER
1−λ
E,t )− 1
]
, (19)
RN,t = 1−RE,t. (20)
Equation (19) can also be rewritten as
RE,t =
√
pE,t
AE,t−1
√
ηER
−λ
E,t
ηN (1−RE,t)−λ + ηER
−λ
E,t + 1− 1
ηER
−λ
E,t
, (21)
which readily highlights the simple closed form solution in the special case where λ = 0.
The consumer problem yields
( ct
ct+1
)−θ
=
βrt+1
(1 + n)
. (22)
Noting that all monopolists make the same decisions and that there is a unit mass of monopolists,
the real interest rate is given by
rt = α
2AN,t
[
1− pE,t
AE,t
]
L1−αt K
α−1
t , (23)
where the market clearing condition from equation (10) has been applied.
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4.3 Equilibrium
Definition 1: A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices, {wt, pX,t, rt, pRt , pE,t}∞t=0, alloca-
tions, {Ct,Kt, Lt, Et, RN,t, RE,t}∞t=0, and technology levels {AN,t, AE,t}∞t=0, such that each of the
following conditions holds ∀t:
• Optimal research allocations solve (19) and (20).
• The law of motion for technology solves (18), noting that all monopolists make identical
decisions.
• Consumer behavior follows the Euler equation, (22).
• Factor prices are given by (4), (45), (14), and (23), noting that all monopolists make identical
decisions.
• The economy obeys laws of motion for total extracted energy, (5), and population, (12).
• The economy obeys market clearing conditions for capital goods, (10), and final goods, (7).
• Initial Conditions AJ,0 for J ∈ [E,N ], K0, L0, and E¯0 are given.
4.4 Balanced Growth Path
Definition 2: A balanced growth path occurs when final output, technology, and consumption
grow at constant rates.
On a balanced growth path (BGP), research allocations remain fixed. Considering equations
(19) and (20), this implies that
AE,t−1
pE,t
is constant. Intuitively, this occurs because of the non-linear
relationship between energy efficiency, AE,t, and the cost of energy per unit of output,
pE,t
AE,t
. When
energy prices increase, monopolists have greater incentive to invest in energy efficient technology,
but this incentive dissipates as technology improves. As a result, on a BGP both energy prices
and energy efficient technology grow at the same constant rate, g∗E .
21 Thus, the increasing price of
energy is exactly offset by improvements in energy efficiency.
Definition 3: The energy share of expenditure (EShare) is total resources paid to energy producers
as a fraction of final output,
pE,tEt
Yt
.
21For the price of energy to grow at a constant rate, energy use must also grow at a constant rate, which will occur
on the BGP.
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Given that energy prices and energy efficient technology grow at the same rate on the BGP, it
is straightforward to show that the energy share of expenditure is constant:
Eshare =
pE,t/AE,t
1− pE,t/AE,t (24)
=
pE,t
AE,t−1(1+g∗E)
1− pE,tAE,t−1(1+g∗E)
. (25)
Thus, despite the Leontief nature of production, the model still delivers a constant long-run energy
expenditure share. The constant relationship between energy efficiency and the price of energy
also demonstrates the remaining properties of the balanced growth path, which match those of the
standard neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition. To see this, note that
TFPt ≡ Yt
Kαt L
1−α
t
(26)
= AN,t
[
1− pE,t
AE,t
]
. (27)
Thus, on the BGP, TFP grows at a constant rate, g∗N . Since the consumer problem is standard,
the model now reduces to the neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition. Thus, the
putty-clay model with directed technical change has the usual BGP properties.
Proposition 1: On a balanced growth path, each of the following holds true:
1. Output per worker and consumption per worker grow at a constant rate, g∗R = (1+g
∗
N )
1
1−α−1.
2. Total output and the capital stock grow at a constant rate, (1 + g∗R)(1 +n)− 1, which implies
that the capital-output ratio is fixed.
3. The real interest rate, rt, is constant.
4. The expenditure shares of energy, capital, and labor are all constant.
5. Energy use grows at rate g∗M =
1+g∗N
1+g∗E
[(1 +g∗N )(1 +n)]
α(1 +n)(1−α)−1, which may be positive
or negative.
Proof. The intuition follows from the preceding discussion, and a formal proof is provided in section
8.5.22
4.5 Comparison to Cobb-Douglas
As mentioned in the introduction, the standard approach in climate change economics is to treat
energy as a Cobb-Douglas component of the aggregate production function (Nordhaus and Boyer,
22In all quantitative applications, the economy converges to the BGP. I have not shown formally that the economy
necessarily converges to the BGP from any initial condition.
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2003; Golosov et al., 2014). In this case, the energy expenditure share is always constant. Thus,
the Cobb-Douglas approach can match long-run elasticity of substitution between energy and non-
energy inputs, but cannot match the near-zero short-run elasticity of substitution. By contrast, the
short-run elasticity of substitution in the putty-clay model developed here is exactly zero. Since
climate change economics is inherently concerned with long-run policy questions, it has been posited
that IAMs may still provide accurate predictions about the reaction of energy use to public policy
interventions over the relevant time frame, even if they cannot match short-run responses (Golosov
et al., 2014). A key component of the quantitative section will be to compare the outcomes of
the Cobb-Douglas model to that of the putty-clay model developed in this paper. In the current
section, I derive a few key properties of the Cobb-Douglas model to facilitate this comparison.
The standard Cobb-Douglas production function is given by:
QCDt = A
CD
t K
α
t E
ν
t L
1−α−ν
t ,
where ACDt grows at an exogenous rate gCD. Since energy extraction costs pE,t units of the final
good, final output is given by
Y CDt = (1− ν)ACDt Kαt Eνt L1−α−νt .
As a result, the energy expenditure share under Cobb-Douglas is given by
ECDshare =
ν
1− ν .
Thus, even on the transition path or in response to new energy taxes, the energy share of expenditure
is constant, which is inconsistent with the data from the United States (see figure 2). When a new
tax raises the effective price of energy, therefore, energy use will immediately decrease enough
to fully offset the increase in price, leaving the expenditure share unchanged. In the putty-clay
model with directed technical change, by contrast, it may take several decades for improvements
in energy efficiency to fully offset an increase in energy prices. Moreover, the long-run energy
expenditure share in the putty-clay model with directed technical change may react to a new tax
regime, especially in the case of continually increasing taxes. The quantitative importance of these
differences is of fundamental importance for climate change economics and will be investigated in
section 6.23
23In appendix section 8.6, I explain the calibration procedure for Cobb-Douglas and describe the balanced growth
path. I calibrate both models so that they have identical predictions for output and energy use in the absence of
environmental taxes. Due to other differences between the models, especially the difference in market structure
– monopolistic competition in the putty-clay model with directed technical change and perfect competition in the
Cobb-Douglas model – predictions for interest rates and levels (though not growth rates) of consumption and capital
differ between the models. Given that incentives for innovation are an important part of the difference between the
two models, I maintain these differences in the quantitative analysis.
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5 Calibration
5.1 External Parameters
The model is solved in 10 year periods. As discussed above, the consumer side of the problem
is standard. Thus, I take several parameters from the existing literature. In particular, I follow
Golosov et al. (2014) and set α = .35, δ = 1, θ = 1, and β = .860.24
I take trend growth rates and the average energy expenditure share from the data. As discussed
above, I use data from 1971-2011. Energy use and energy price data are from the U.S. Energy
Information Agency. Prices are only available for fossil fuel energy. Thus, I also only use fossil fuel
energy in the analysis. As discussed above, this is a good fit the energy sector in the model, which
is motivated by increasing extraction costs in fossil fuel energy sources. Gross Domestic Product
data are from the BEA.
Following the structure of the model, I calculate gross output, Qt, as final output, Yt, plus
energy expenditure. I measure AE,t = Et/Qt, yielding g
∗
E = .2608 on the BGP (2.35% annual
growth). Assuming that, on average, the economy is on the BGP during the sample period, gN
can be measured as the growth rate of output per capita. This yields g∗N = .2606 on the BGP. The
average energy expenditure share in the data is 3.3%, which I take to be the balanced growth level.
Below, I calibrate the R&D sector of the model to match key BGP moments. The BGP is
uninformative about research congestion, λ, which measures the trade-off between advances in
overall productivity and energy efficiency. As a base value, I take λ = .21 from Fried (2015), who
also captures the congestion of moving scientists from energy-related research to general purpose
research, making it a natural starting point for quantitative exercises presented here. I will also
consider cases where λ ∈ [0, .11, .31] for robustness.
5.2 R&D Calibration
The key R&D parameters remaining to be calibrated are the inherent efficiencies of each sector,
ηN and ηE . To calibrate them, it is also necessary to solve for R
∗
E . To start, I re-write the research
arbitrage equation in terms of observables,
1 + g∗E
1 + g∗N
= E∗share
ηE
ηN
( R∗E
1−R∗E
)−λ
. (28)
This equation has a natural interpretation. Monopolists must trade-off the relevant benefits and
costs of investing in the two types of technology. Eshare is a summary measure of the incentive
to invest in energy efficiency that fully captures the relative benefits of improving each type of
technology. When the energy share of expenditure is higher, monopolists have greater incentive to
24I normalize TFP0 = E0 = L0 = 10. This normalization simply sets the units of the analysis and has no effect
on the quantitative results of the model. I also assume that the economy is on the BGP at time t = 0. Given the
other parameters in the model, this yields Y0 = 84.96, K0 = 6.28, pE,0 = .28, AE,0 = 8.72, AN,0 = 10.33. These
normalizations set the scale for energy sector parameters, ξ and E¯1.
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invest in energy efficiency. The remaining terms capture the relative costs, i.e. relative research
efficiencies, of investing in the two types of technology. The term ηEηN captures the inherent pro-
ductivities of the two sectors, while
( R∗E
1−R∗E
)−λ
captures the differences in efficiencies due to the
differing levels of congestion.
In the data, g∗E ≈ g∗N . Since the measured energy expenditure share is low (3.3%), the relative
efficiency of energy efficiency research must be high. Moreover, a substantial fraction of this relative
efficiency must come from the inherent productivities. This is true because total productivity
growth in each type of technology is an increasing function of R&D inputs devoted to that sector.
If the difference in marginal research efficiencies was due only to congestion, then the growth rate
of energy efficiency technology, g∗E , would have to be much smaller than the growth rate of output-
increasing technology, g∗N . Thus, the data strongly suggest that the inherent productivity of energy
efficiency research is significantly higher than the efficiency of other types of research.25
To complete the R&D calibration, I add the following two equations:
g∗E = ηE(R
∗
E)
1−λ, (29)
g∗N = ηN (1−R∗E)1−λ. (30)
These equations ensure that levels of technological progress match their values in the data, thereby
quantifying the intuition given above. As expected, ηE is significantly greater than ηN . The exact
values for all of the parameters are provided in table 1.
5.3 Energy Sector Calibration
To calibrate the remaining parameters for the energy sector, I start by noting that, on the BGP,
energy use grows at a constant rate, g∗M . The most important parameter for the energy sector is ι,
which captures the rate at which growth in energy use translates into growth in energy prices,
ι =
ln(1 + g∗E)
ln(1 + g∗M )
. (31)
In the model, energy taxes will lower energy use and the price energy. This will have the general
equilibrium effect of lowering the incentive for energy efficient research and increasing the demand
for capital. The size of these effects depends directly on ι.
Next, to ensure that the economy starts in a steady state, it must be the case the total extracted
energy grows at a constant rate. Thus, we can calculate the initial level of extracted energy as:
E¯−1 = g∗M/E0, (32)
25From an environmental perspective, this seems like a very promising result – improvements in energy efficiency
can occur with only small amounts of labor reallocation. Despite this optimistic result, the putty-clay model with
directed technical change suggests that much less energy is saved in response to new taxes, when compared to the
standard Cobb-Douglas approach.
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Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Value Description Source
α .35 Capital Share of Income PWT
δ 1 Depreciation Golosov et al. (2014)
β .860 Discount Factor Golosov et al. (2014)
θ 1 Inter-temporal substitution Golosov et al. (2014)
λ 0.21 Research congestion Fried (2015)
ηE 3.96 Research efficiency Calibrated
ηN 0.27 Research efficiency Calibrated
ι 1.72 Energy cost growth Calibrated
ξ 0.01 Energy cost scale Calibrated
E¯−1 16.53 Initial extracted energy Calibrated
where E¯−1 is the total energy used on the last period before the energy taxes are announced. As
noted above, the specific level of E¯−1 is uninformative and simply reflects the scale chosen for E0.
Finally, ξ is a scale parameter calibrated to the starting price,
ξ =
pE,0
E¯ι−1
. (33)
5.4 Solving the Model
Conditional on the price of energy, the model can separated into three pieces: the R&D allocations,
the standard consumer problem from the neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition,
and the energy sector. The fact that innovation occurs in different characteristics of capital goods,
rather than in different sectors, facilitates the solution of the model. In particular, equations (19)
and (20) demonstrate that, conditional on the price of energy, the R&D allocations and technology
growth rates can be solved independently of the consumer problem. To find the equilibrium, then,
I employ the following steps:26
1. Guess a vector of energy prices.
2. Solve for productivity paths and R&D allocations using equations (8), (19) and (20), noting
that all monopolists make identical research decisions.
3. Solve the neoclassical growth model conditional on the path of productivities using equations
(64) - (70) in appendix section 8.5.
4. Back out implied energy use and energy prices using equations (2), (4), and (5). This takes
advantage of the fact that (3) holds with equality in all periods.
26In all quantitative applications, this procedure is sufficient to find a competitive equilibrium. I have not shown
that such a procedure must converge to an equilibrium, or that the competitive equilibrium is unique. In all cases, I
use the BGP in the absence of energy taxes to generate the initial guess of energy prices.
19
5. Check if the initial guess and resulting prices are the same. If they are, then consumers have
made optimal decisions taking all future prices as given and the economy is in equilibrium.
6. If the economy is not in equilibrium, start from (1) with a convex combination of initial guess
and resulting prices.
6 Quantitative Results
In this section, I examine the effect of energy taxes in the putty-clay model of directed technical
change and compare the results to those in the standard Cobb-Douglas model. The time period
in the model is ten years. All future policies are announced in the initial period, which I take as
2005 to match the stated objectives of international climate agreements. All policies take effect
in 2015. The gap between the announcement and implementation of the policy allows one round
of endogenous and directed technical change to occur before comparing the outcomes across the
two models. If the policy were unexpected, the final good producer in the Cobb-Douglas model
could react, whereas there would be no adjustment in the putty-clay model with directed technical
change due to the Leontief structure. Thus, this approach lessens the difference between the two
models by not considering the very short run.
6.1 Long-Run Sustainability
Before comparing the effects of policy between the two models, I briefly consider the implications
for sustainable economic growth in the putty-clay model with directed technical change. The
model predicts that consumption can continue to grow at its current rate, even as extraction
costs tend towards infinity in the long run. This result creates a significant difference with the
work of Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b), who are focused on the use of oil and the social planner’s
problem. The intuition for the difference is straightforward. In both cases, effective (technology-
inclusive) energy and non-energy inputs must grow and the same rate on the balanced growth
path, i.e, AE,tEt = AN,tK
α
t L
1−α
t . Moreover, total inputs available for research are fixed. In the
social planner solution with finite energy, total energy use must decrease along the BGP. Currently,
however, energy use in increasing. Thus, in the model of Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b) we cannot
currently be on the BGP, and in the long run, some research effort must be moved from non-energy
research into energy research to maintain the equality of growth rates between effective energy and
non-energy inputs. This implies that the growth rate of general purpose technological progress and
consumption must fall.
The model examined in this paper has an infinite supply of energy that can be extracted at
increasing cost. Moreover, I examine the outcome in the decentralized economy. In this case, there
is no restriction that energy use must be decreasing in the long-run, implying that recent trends can
be continued indefinitely. Figure 2 indicates that the long-run average of the energy expenditure
share has been roughly constant (at 3.3%) in the United States over the last 40 years, and I take
this as evidence that this is approximately the BGP level of the energy expenditure share. This
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implies, in turn, that growth rates of output and consumption can continue indefinitely on their
current paths. In this way, the results presented here build upon Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b) by
considering how the existence of unlimited energy supplies (even with extraction costs tending
towards infinity) and consideration of the decentralized equilibrium affect long-run predictions
regarding consumption growth. This result is consistent with the Cobb-Douglas approach, which
also assumes that the energy expenditure share will remain and its current level (Golosov et al.,
2014; Barrage, 2014).
6.2 Energy Taxes
To best understand the quantitative impacts of the new model of energy use developed in this paper,
it is necessary to consider a realistic path of future energy taxes. Under the recent Paris Agreement
on climate change, the United States aims to adopt policies consistent with a 80% reduction in
carbon emissions by the year 2050, when compared to 2005 levels. I apply taxes such that half
of this gain, a 40% reduction, comes from reductions in energy use.27 The evidence in figure 1
suggests that energy efficiency has been responsible for well more than half of past decreases in the
carbon intensity of output. I consider a path of proportional energy taxes that grow at a constant
rate,
τt = 1 · (1 + gτ )
t−2005
10 . (34)
To achieve the environmental goals given above, the putty-clay model with directed technical change
requires gτ = .47, implying that heavy energy taxation is necessary to achieve environmental policy
goals outlined in prominent international agreements. In particular, this yields a 6.9-fold tax rate
in 2055. All taxes are rebated to consumers in a lump sum fashion.
Figure 3 presents the outcomes of the model under the path of proportional energy taxes
outlined above. In particular, it demonstrates the paths of energy use, output, TFP, consumption,
and capital from 2005 to 2115. All outcomes are given as a fraction of the baseline scenario, which
has zero energy taxation. As expected, energy taxes simultaneously increase the energy expenditure
share and decrease energy use. In other words, monopolists have increased incentive to invest in
energy efficiency, but this incentive is insufficient to improve energy efficiency enough to fully offset
the increase in the price of energy. In this way, it is already apparent that the results will differ
from those in the Cobb-Douglas model.
By 2055, the economy experiences an 6.8% decrease in consumption and 4.3% decrease in TFP
relative to the baseline. Energy use plummets to 9.0% of baseline by the end of the century.
At the same time, consumption decreases by 10.9% and TFP is 6.6% lower than in the baseline
scenario without energy taxes. Discounted back 100 years, this lost consumption will have a very
small impact of the current-day utility of the representative household. Within climate change
economics, however, there is a spirited debate as to whether the discount rate held by individual
27Since the model is solved in ten year periods, I choose taxes such that the 40% reduction occurs by 2055.
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Figure 3: This table demonstrates the effect of energy taxes in the putty-clay model with directed technical change.
Energy taxes are proportional to the price of energy and grow at a constant rate: τt = 1 ·(1+gτ ) t−200510 , with gτ = .47.
This level of taxation achieves a 40% reduction in energy in by 2055, compared to 2005 levels. All taxes are rebated
to consumers in a lump sum fashion. All outcomes in the figure are given as a fraction of the outcomes in the baseline
scenario, which has no energy taxation.
consumers is appropriate for social welfare calculations (Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 2013; Barrage,
2016). Given that consumption losses are back-loaded, discount rate choices would have significant
effects on welfare in this setting.
Figure 4 repeats the analysis for the standard Cobb-Douglas model with exogenous technological
progress. Once again, all outcomes are given relative to the baseline scenario with no energy taxes.
The effect of policy in the Cobb-Douglas approach differs considerably from the putty-clay model
with directed technical change. In this case, gτ = .36 is sufficient to achieve a 40% reduction in
energy use by 2055, and τ2055 = 4.65. To achieve the environmental policy priories, consumption
decreases by 2.0% in 2055 and 3.7% by the end of the century, relative to a ‘business as usual’ case
without taxes. By the end of the century, energy use is 13% of baseline levels.
As expected, the energy share of expenditure is essentially unchanged in the Cobb-Douglas
model.28 Thus, energy use decreases by enough to fully offset the increase in energy prices. This
can be seen in how quickly the Cobb-Douglas model responds to new taxes. In 2015, energy use
decreases by almost 30% compared to the baseline, in comparison to a 10% decrease in the putty-
clay model with directed technical change. This occurs even though the tax rate is lower in the
Cobb-Douglas model.
28The slight decrease in the energy expenditure share is due to the lump sum tax rebates. The expenditure share
of energy in gross output is constant, but after taxes are implemented, a proportion of energy expenditure is rebated
to consumers.
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Figure 4: This table demonstrates the effect of energy taxes in the standard Cobb-Douglas model with exogenous
technological progress. Energy taxes are proportional to the price of energy and grow at a constant rate: τt =
1 · (1 + gτ ) t−200510 , with gτ = .36. This level of taxation achieves a 40% reduction in energy in by 2055, compared
to 2005 levels. All taxes are rebated to consumers in a lump sum fashion. All outcomes in the figure are given as a
fraction of the outcomes in the baseline scenario, which has zero energy taxation.
Figure 5 provides a direct comparison of energy use and consumption in the two models when
applying the same path of energy taxes, specifically those necessary to achieve environmental policy
priorities in the Cobb-Douglas model. Thus, the analysis quantifies the error that would occur if
policy was designed with the Cobb-Douglas model, but the true economy was putty-clay with
directed technical change. Energy use is measured as a fraction of the 2005 level, and consumption
is measured relative to the baseline.29
When applying the requisite taxes from the Cobb-Douglas model to the putty-clay model with
directed technical change, energy use in 2055 declines by 24% when compared to 2005 levels, missing
the environmental target 16 percentage points. At the same time, forgone consumption is 2.7
percentage points higher than would be expected by policy-makers using the Cobb-Douglas model.
Despite the goals of policy, what matters for overall environmental conditions is the cumulative
difference in energy use, which is given by the area between the two energy use curves. Over
the course of the coming century, cumulative energy use is 20% higher in the putty-clay model
with directed technical change. These results further illuminate the important differences between
the two models and demonstrate that policy designed for the Cobb-Douglas model would yield
drastically different outcomes in a world more closely resembling the putty-clay model with directed
technical change.
29Given the difference in market structure, the baseline level of consumption, but not the growth rate of consump-
tion, differs in the two models.
23
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120
Year
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
E (%2005)
E (Cobb-Douglas)
C (%baseline)
C (Cobb-Douglas)
Figure 5: This table demonstrates the difference between the putty-clay model of directed technical change and
the standard Cobb-Douglas model with exogenous technological progress. Energy taxes are proportional to the price
of energy and grow at a constant rate: τt = 1 · (1 + gτ ) t−201510 , with gτ = .36. In the Cobb-Douglas model with
exogenous technical change, this level of taxation achieves a 40% reduction in energy in by 2055, compared to 2005
levels. All taxes are rebated to consumers in a lump sum fashion. Energy use is measured as a fraction of 2005
levels. Consumption is measured relative to the baseline, which does not include energy taxes. The baseline level of
consumption differs in the two models.
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In appendix section 8.7, I demonstrate the robustness of these core results to alternate scenarios.
In particular, I consider alternate values of the congestion parameter, λ, and the results when energy
prices increase at an exogenous rate. All robustness exercises are conducted with the same path of
energy taxes to facilitate comparison between the results. Also, I re-calibrate the putty-clay model
for each new value of λ.
Decreasing research congestion yields more similar results between the two models by allowing
for faster energy reductions in the putty-clay model. Even in the extreme case of zero research
congestion, however, the difference between the models is large (see figure 7). When prices are
exogenous, smaller amounts of taxation are needed to meet environmental policy goals. In par-
ticular, gτ = .4 in the putty-clay model with directed technical change. This result is intuitive
since endogenous price movements mitigate the effect of taxes. The results are presented in figures
12–14.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I build a tractable putty-clay model of directed technical change and use it to analyze
the effect of environmental policies on energy use in the United States. The model matches several
key data patterns that cannot be explained by the standard Cobb-Douglas approach used in climate
change economics. The results suggest that large taxes are necessary to achieve environmental goals
laid out in international agreements. In particular, the new putty-clay model of directed technical
change suggests that a 6.9-fold energy tax in 2055 is necessary to achieve policy goals consistent
with the 2016 Paris Agreement and that such a tax would lead to 6.8% lower consumption when
compared to a world without taxes. By contrast, the standard Cobb-Douglas approach suggests
that a 4.7-fold tax rate in 2055 is sufficient, which leads to a 2% decrease in consumption. When
applying the same tax rate to both models, the new putty-clay model of directed technical change
predicts 20% more energy use over the next century. Thus, compared to the standard approach, the
new model predicts that greater taxation and more forgone consumption are necessary to achieve
environmental policy goals.
There are several possible extensions to the analysis presented here that would provide impor-
tant insights into environmental policy questions. The most direct extension would entail adding a
third margin of technological investment in clean versus dirty technology. In this case, it would be
possible to gain a more complete understanding of the effect of carbon taxes on emissions. Com-
bined with a model of the carbon cycle, such an analysis could yield important updates to existing
estimates of optimal carbon taxes. It would also allow for the comparison of important second-best
policies, such as subsidies for renewable energy – which would limit the incentive to improve energy
efficiency – and energy taxes or efficiency mandates, which provide no incentive to invest in clean
energy sources.
Another extension would be to expand the geographic scope. The analysis presented here focuses
on a single economy, but there are important implications for a multi-region world. In particular,
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existing analyses with exogenous technological progress suggest that unilateral policy actions among
rich countries will have small impacts on overall carbon emissions (Nordhaus, 2010). In a world with
endogenous technological progress and diffusion or trade, however, unilateral policies would improve
worldwide energy efficiency, leading to greater environmental benefit. This magnifies the difference
with the standard Cobb-Douglas approach, where substitution of capital for energy in one country
would have no direct impact on other countries. The positive implications of these international
spillovers could potentially outweigh the more pessimistic conclusions about the reaction of energy
use to taxation that result from considering the putty-clay model with directed technical change.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Microfoundation
In this section, I provide a simple microfoundation for the aggregate production function, (2), which
highlights the continuity with the existing DTC literature. Consider the following equation,
Yt = L
1−α
t
∫ 1
0
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
αEt(i)
Rt(i)
di (35)
s.t. E(i) ≤ R(i), (36)
where Lt is the aggregate (and inelastic) labor supply, AN,t(i) is the the quality of capital good i,
Xt(i) is the quantity of capital good i, Rt(i) is the amount of energy required to run capital good
i at full capacity, and Et(i) is the amount of actual energy used to run capital good i.
It is easiest to start by comparing this equation to the standard production function used in DTC
models (and, more generally, in many endogenous growth models): Yt = L
1−α
t
∫ 1
0 AN,t(i)Xt(i)
αdi.
Here, final production is the combination of a set of processes, each of which combines aggregate
labor, L, with a specific capital good, Xt(i). The effectiveness of each process is determined by
the quality of the capital good, AN,t(i). Each of these processes is perfectly substitutable with
the others, though each is used in equilibrium because of diminishing returns. To this standard
approach, I add energy requirements. In particular, I assume that each piece of capital requires a
specific amount of energy, Rt(i), to run at full capacity. If the amount of energy, Et(i), devoted
to process i is less than Rt(i), then the final goods producer receives less than the full benefit of
that process. In particular, if the final good producer allocates, say, 80% of the required energy,
i.e. Et(i)/Rt(i) = .8, then it receives 80% of full capacity output.
To actually work with the model, it is necessary to assign a functional form to the energy
requirement function, R(i). Consider the following specification:
Rt(i) = AN,t(i)L
1−α
t Xt(i)
α 1
AE,t(i)
, (37)
where AE,t(i) is a measure of energy efficiency. There are several key things to note about this
function. First, consistent with the econometric literature on energy use, energy requirements
depend both on the amount of capital and the amount of labor being used in the production
process (Van der Werf, 2008; Hassler et al., 2012). Second, consistent with both the econometric
and DTC literatures, improvements in non-energy technology, AN,t(i), raise energy requirements
(Smulders and De Nooij, 2003; Van der Werf, 2008; Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b; Fried, 2015). In
appendix section 8.2, I solve the final goods producer problems and demonstrate that the two
production functions, (2) and (35), are equivalent.
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8.2 Final Good Producer Problem
In this section, I show derive the inverse demand functions (13) and (14) and demonstrate that the
basic production function (2) is equivalent to the microfounded version in appendix 8.1. Consider
the maximization of (35) subject to (36) with λt(i) as the Lagrange multiplier attached to capital
good i,
L = L1−αt
∫ 1
0
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
αEt(i)
Rt(i)
di− wtLt −
∫ 1
0
pX,t(i)Xt(i) di− pE,t
∫ 1
0
Et(i) di
−
∫ 1
0
λt(i)
[
Et(i)−Rt(i)
]
di. (38)
Complementary slackness implies
λt(i)
[
Et(i)−Rt(i)
]
= 0 ∀i. (39)
Substituting Rt(i) from (37) yields
L = L1−αt
∫ 1
0
AE,t(i)Et(i)di− wtLt −
∫ 1
0
pX,t(i)Xt(i) di− pE,t
∫ 1
0
Et(i) di
−
∫ 1
0
λt(i)
[
Et(i)−AN,t(i)L1−αt Xt(i)α
1
AE,t(i)
]
di. (40)
Now, complementary slackness implies
λt(i)
[
Et(i)−AN,t(i)L1−αt Xt(i)α
1
AE,t(i)
]
= 0 ∀i. (41)
The solution to equations (40) and (41) yields the optimal behavior of the final goods producer.
Importantly, this is exactly the same problem that arises from maximizing (2) subject to (3). This
can be seen by multiplying and dividing both (41) and the last term of (40) by AE(i) and redefining
the Lagrange multiplier appropriately. Thus, the two production functions are equivalent.
I focus on the case where (3) holds with equality. For this to be true, it is sufficient, but not
necessary, to assume that δ = 1, as noted in the main text. Consider the first order conditions of
the final good producer,
( ∂L
∂Et(i)
)
: λt(i) = 1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
, (42)
( ∂L
∂Xt(i)
)
: λt(i) =
pX,t(i)
αAN,t(i)L
1−α
t Xt(i)
α−1 , (43)( ∂L
∂Lt
)
: λt(i) =
wt
(1− α)AN,t(i)L−αt Xt(i)α
. (44)
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Substituting (43) and (44) into (42), respectively, and multiplying through yields
pX,t(i) = αAN,t(i)
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L1−αt Xt(i)
α−1, (45)
wt = (1− α)AN,t(i)
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L−αt Xt(i)
α. (46)
Thus, we have arrived at equation (13) and (14) from the text. They key result here is that inverse
demand is iso-elastic, which allows for the usual simple closed forms. Moreover, the expenditure
shares of all factors will be constant.
8.3 Monopolist Problem
The monopolist maximizes profits subject to demand and research productivity constraints:
max piX,t(i) = pX,t(i)Xt(i)− rtX(i)− pRE,tRE(i)− pRN,tRN (i), (47)
(48)
subject to
pX,t(i) = αAN,t(i)
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L1−αt Xt(i)
α−1, (49)
AJ,t(i) =
[
1 + ηJRJ,t(i)R
−λ
J,t
]
AJ,t−1, J ∈ {N,E}, (50)
RJ,t(i) ∈ [0, 1], J ∈ {N,E}. (51)
First, substitute (49) into (47) and take the first order condition with respect to X(i). Constraints
(50) and (51) are independent of the production level, Xt(i). Hence, we get the standard first order
conditions and results,
rt = α
2AN,t(i)
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L1−αt Xt(i)
α−1, (52)
Xt(i) = α
2
1−α r
−1
1−αAN,t(i)
1
1−αLt
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α , (53)
pX,t(i) =
1
α
rt. (54)
Next, to find optimal profits, we can re-write the monopolist problem after substituting in results
we have found so far:
max piX,t(i) = α˜r
−α
1−α
t AN,t(i)
1
1−αLt
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α − pRE,tRE,t(i)− pRN,tRN,t(i) (55)
subject to
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AJ,t(i) =
[
1 + ηJRJ,t(i)R
−λ
J,t
]
AJ,t−1, J ∈ {N,E}, (56)
RJ,t(i) ∈ [0, 1], J ∈ {N,E}, (57)
where α˜ = ( 1α − 1)α
2
1−α . The first order conditions for technology levels and research scientist
allocations yields
pRN,t = ψA
α
1−α
N,t
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α ηNR
−λ
N,tAN,t−1, (58)
pRE,t = ψA
1
1−α
N,t pE,tAE,t(i)
−2[1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
] α
1−α ηER
−λ
E,tAE,t−1, (59)
where ψ = α˜1−αr
−α
1−α
t Lt is common to both terms. In the next section, I shown the optimal research
allocations resulting from these first order conditions. Taking ratios of these first order conditions
yields (18) in the main text.
8.4 R&D Allocations
In this section, I derive the optimal research allocations given in equations (19), (20), and (21).
First, note that RJ,t(i) = RJ,t ∀i, t. This occurs because all monpolists make identical decisions
and there is a unit mass of monopolists. This also implies that AJ,t(i) = AJ,t ∀i, t. Also, factor
mobility ensures that pRE,t = p
R
N,t ∀t. Thus, equation (18) can then be re-written as
1
ηER
−λ
E
AE,t
AE,t−1
[ AE
pE,t
− 1] = AN,t
AN,t−1
1
ηNR
−λ
N
. (60)
Replacing growth rates and technology levels with the values given by (8) yields (19) and applying
the resource constraint (9) yields (20). I now continue to derive (21). Multiplying by the denomi-
nator on the left hand side and distributing the left-hand side terms outside the bracket and then
reversing the sides of the equation yields
[
(1 + ηER
1−λ
E )
2AE,t−1
pE,t
− (1 + ηER1−λE )
]
=
ηER
−λ
E
ηN (1−RE)−λ
(
1 + ηN (1−RE)1−λ
)
. (61)
Now, isolating the term including the energy price yields
[(1 + ηER
1−λ
E )
2AE,t−1
pE,t
=
ηER
−λ
E
ηN (1−RE)−λ + ηER
−λ
E + 1. (62)
Now, (21) can be derived by multiplying through by
pE,t
AE,t−1 , taking the square root of both sides,
subtracting one, and dividing by ηER
−λ
E .
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8.5 Solving the Model
In this section, I solve the consumer portion of the model in intensive form. This simultaneously
demonstrates the conditions listed in Proposition 1 and demonstrates how to solve the model
computationally as discussed in section 5.4. As described in that section, I can take the path
of productivities as given for this exercise. This portion of the model is almost equivalent to a
standard neoclassical growth model. The only differences are a) the interest rate must be adjusted
for monopolistic competition and taxes, and b) the growth rate of TFP may not be constant.
Let τt be the proportional energy tax applied at time t. For any variable Zt, I define:
zt ≡ Zt
LtAR,t
, (63)
where AR,t = TFP
1
1−α
t and TFP = AN,t
[
1− pE,tAE,t
]
. Applying (6), (7), and (10), this yields
yt = k
α
t , (64)
kt+1 =
yt − ct
(1 + gr,t+1)(1 + n)
, (65)
where 1 + gr,t =
AR,t
AR,t−1 = (1 + gTFP,t)
1
1−α . Moreover, the Euler equation yields
(ct+1
ct
)
=
βrt+1
(1 + gr,t+1)(1 + n)
, (66)
where I have taken advantage of the fact that θ = 1.
Finally, when considering the interest rate, it is also important to keep track of the energy tax
rate, τt. Let A˜R,t = AN,t
[
1− τtpE,tAE,t
]
be TFP adjusted for energy taxes. Then, from equation (16),
rt = α
2
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t
]
AN,tK
α−1
t L
1−α
t (67)
= α2
( Kt
A˜R,tLt
)α−1
(68)
= α2
(AR,t
A˜R,t
)α−1( Kt
AR,tLt
)α−1
(69)
= τ˜tα
2kα−1t , (70)
where τ˜t ≡
(AR,t
A˜R,t
)α−1
is the interest rate wedge caused by the introduction of energy taxes.
Thus, the solution to the model is given by (64), (65) (66) and (70), noting that gR,t and τ˜t are
determined by the research allocations and can be taken as exogenous for this part of the solution.
As described above, this is just the standard neoclassical growth model with a few additions. The
α2 term in (70) is the standard adjustment for monopolistic competition, τ˜t is the wedge in the
interest rate caused by carbon taxes, and gR,t may not be constant due to endogenous research
allocations.
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To find the BGP, I set τ = 1. This refers to a ‘business as usual’ scenario with no new energy
taxes, though a BGP exists with any fixed τ . As discussed in the main text, gTFP = g
∗
N on the
BGP because
[
1− pE,tAE,t
]
is fixed. Thus, g∗R = (1 + g
∗
N )
1
1−α − 1. This yields
r¯ =
(1 + g∗R)(1 + n)
β
, (71)
k¯ =
( r¯
α2
) 1
α−1 , (72)
y¯ = k¯α, (73)
c¯ = y¯ − (1 + g∗R)(1 + n)k¯. (74)
Thus, rt is constant, Yt/Lt and Ct/Lt grow at rate g
∗
R, and Yt and Kt grow at rate g
∗
Y = (1 +
g∗R)(1 + n)− 1.
At any point in time, energy use is given by
Et =
AN,t
AE,t
Kαt L
1−α
t . (75)
On the BGP, therefore, the growth rate of energy is given by
g∗M =
(
(1 + g∗N )
(1 + g∗E)
(1 + g∗Y )
α(1 + n)1−α
)
− 1. (76)
To find the expenditure shares, I apply all of the market clearing conditions to the factor price
equations. To start, from equation (14) note that
wtLt = (1− α)AN,t[1− pE,t
AE,t
]KαL1−α = (1− α)Yt. (77)
Next, from (23) and (16),
rtKt = α
2AN,t[1− pE,t
AE,t
]KαL1−α = α2Yt. (78)
The remaining share, (1−α−α2)Yt, is the pre-R&D spending production profits of the monopolists.
This can be further divided into pure profits and payments to research inputs. All research inputs
are hired at the same rate. By equation (58), total payments to research inputs is given by
pRt = (
1
α
− 1)rtXt
AN,t
ηNR
−λ
N AN,t−1 (79)
= (
1
α
− 1) · ηN (R
∗
N )
−λ
1 + g∗N
· α2Yt, (80)
noting that there is a unit mass of research inputs. The remaining share of final output is paid to
monopolists as profits.
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8.6 The Cobb-Douglas Model
In this section, I derive the BGP results for the Cobb-Douglas model and describe the calibration
procedure. Let τt be the proportional energy tax applied at time t. To start, I note that, due to
perfect competition, aggregate energy use is given by
Et =
( ν
τtpE,t
) 1
1−ν (ACDt )
1
1−νK
α
1−ν
t L
1−α−ν
1−ν
t . (81)
This, in turn, yields
Qt =
( ν
pE,t · τt
) ν
1−ν (ACDt )
1
1−νK
α
1−ν
t L
(1−α−ν)
1−ν
t , (82)
Yt =
(
1− ν
τ
)
Qt. (83)
To find the BGP, I assume τt = 1 and consider the ‘business as usual’ scenario without any new
energy taxes. The BGP exists for any fixed tax. I define
zt =
Zt
Lt(ACDt )
1
1−α−ν (τt · pE,t)
−ν
1−ν−α
, (84)
for any variable Zt. This notation is specific to appendix section 8.6.
The Euler equation is the same as in the putty-clay case. In intensive form,
ct+1
ct
=
βrt+1
(1 + gCD)
1
1−ν−α (1 + g˜P,t+1)
−ν
1−ν−α (1 + n)
, (85)
where 1 + g˜P,t+1 = (1 + gτ,t+1)(1 + gP,t+1) and 1 + gτ,t =
τt
τt−1 . The rest of the dynamics are given
by
kt+1 =
yt − ct
(1 + gCD,t+1)
1
1−ν−α (1 + g˜P,t+1)
−ν
1−ν−α (1 + n)
, (86)
yt = (1− ν
τ
)k
α
1−ν
t , (87)
rt = αk
α−(1−ν)
1−ν
t . (88)
Thus, on the initial BGP, where energy prices grow at a constant rate, g∗P , and energy taxes are
constant,
r¯ =
(1 + g∗CD)
1
1−ν−α (1 + g∗P )
−ν
1−ν−α (1 + n)
β
, (89)
k¯ = (r¯/α)
1−ν
α−(1−ν) , (90)
y¯ = (1− ν)k¯ α1−ν , (91)
c¯ = y¯ − (1 + g∗CD)
1
1−ν−α (1 + g∗P )
−ν
1−ν−α (1 + n)k¯. (92)
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As a result, rt is constant, Yt/Lt and Ct/Lt grow at rate (g
∗
R)
CD = (1+g∗CD)
1
1−ν−α (1+g∗P )
−ν
1−ν−α −1,
and Yt and Kt grow at rate g
CD
Y = (1 + g
∗
R)
CD(1 + n)− 1.
I calibrate the model to the BGP using the same data as employed for the putty-clay model,
leading to observationally equivalent paths for output and energy use. To match the energy expen-
diture share, I set
ν
1− ν = 3.3% ⇒ ν = .032. (93)
All that remains is to ensure that total output grows at the same rate in the two models, which
implies that energy use will also grow at the same rate. Since the energy sector is equivalent in the
two models, this further implies that the price of energy will grow at the same rate. Thus, I set
(g∗R)
CD = g∗R, where the later comes from the putty-clay model in section 8.5. This implies that
g∗R = (1 + g
∗
CD)
1
1−ν−α (1 + g∗P )
−ν
1−ν−α − 1 ⇒ (94)
g∗CD = (1 + g
∗
R)
1−α−ν(1 + g∗E)
ν − 1. (95)
The calibration yields g∗CD = .42, which corresponds to an annual growth rate of 3.5%. The growth
rate of TFP is higher in the Cobb-Douglas case because it needs to overcome the drag of rising
energy prices to achieve the same BGP rates of growth in consumption and output.
8.7 Robustness Exercises
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Figure 6: Robustness for table 3 with λ = 0.
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Figure 7: Robustness for table 5 with λ = 0.
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Figure 8: Robustness for table 3 with λ = .31.
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120
Year
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
E (%2005)
E (Cobb-Douglas)
C (%baseline)
C (Cobb-Douglas)
Figure 9: Robustness for table 5 with λ = .31.
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Figure 10: Robustness for table 3 with λ = .11.
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Figure 11: Robustness for table 5 with λ = .11.
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Figure 12: Robustness for table 3 with exogenous energy prices. In this case, gτ = .4.
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Figure 13: Robustness for table 4 with exogenous energy prices. In this case, gτ = .26.
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Figure 14: Robustness for table 5 with exogenous energy prices. In this case, gτ = .26.
43
